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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH : 
Plaintiff/Appellee : 
vs. : 
: Case No. 041902619 FS 
PAUL IRONHORSE NEWKIRK, App. No. 20050458-CA 
Defendant/Appellant : 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
The Appellant is appealing from a Judgment, Sentence and Commitment in 
the Second District Court for Weber County, Utah, dated June 8, 2005. The 
Defendant was found guilty by a jury of Burglary, a third degree felony and 
Theft a class A misdemeanor. He was sentenced to serve an indeterminate 
term of zero to five years and 365 days at the Utah State Prison. Jurisdiction 
for the Appeal is conferred upon the Utah Court of Appeals pursuant to U.C.A. 
§78-2a-3(2)(e)(2004). 
ISSUE ON APPEAL AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
DID THE DEFENDANT RECEIVE INEFFECTIVE 
ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL WHEN HIS ATTORNEY 
OPENED THE DOOR FOR PRIOR BAD ACTS AND THEN 
REFERED TO THEM DURING CLOSING ARGUMENTS? 
Standard of Review: The appellate court must determine as a matter of 
fact and law whether the Defendant was denied his right to effective assistance 
of counsel. In Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S 668, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984), 
the United States Supreme Court articulated a two part test, which was adopted 
in State v. Templin, 805 P.2d 182 (Utah 1990), to determine whether counsel 
was ineffective. The Court held that; 
First, the defendant must show that counsel's performance was 
deficient. This requires showing that counsel made errors so 
serious that counsel was not functioning as the counsel guaranteed 
the defendant by the Sixth Amendment. Second, the defendant 
must show that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense. 
This requires showing that counsel's errors were so serious as to 
deprive the defendant of a fair trial, a trial whose result is reliable. 
Id at 466 U.S. at 687, 80 L.Ed. 2d at 693. 
Furthermore, since this testimony was not objected to and was actually 
elicited by Defendant's attorney it should be analyzed under a plain error 
standard of review. There is a three part test to determine whether a trial 
court has committed plain error. See, State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 
(Utah 1993). The test is that "(0 a n e r r o r exists; (ii) the error should have 
been obvious to the trial court; and (iii) the error is harmful, i.e., absent 
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the error, there is a reasonable likelihood of a more favorable outcome 
for the appellant..." Id. at 1208. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 
Sixth Amendment 
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and 
public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime 
shall have been committed, which district shall have been previously 
ascertained by law, and to be informed of the nature and cause of the 
accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses against him; to have 
compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the 
Assistance of Counsel for his defense. 
UTAH CODE ANNOTATED 
U.C.A. §78-2a-3(2)(e)(2004). -Court of Appeals jurisdiction. 
(2) The Court of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction, including jurisdiction of 
interlocutory appeals, over: 
(e) appeals from a court of record in criminal cases, except those 
involving a conviction or charge of a first degree felony or capital felony; 
UTAH RULES OF EVIDENCE 
Rule 404(b) of the Utah Rules of Evidence states, 
Evidence of other crimes, wrongs or acts is not admissible to prove the 
character of a person in order to show action in conformity therewith. It 
may, however, be admissible for other purposes, such as proof of 
motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or 
absence of mistake or accident. In other words, evidence offered under 
this rule is admissible if it is relevant for a non-character purpose and 
meets the requirements of 402 and 403.U.R.E. 404(b)(2002). 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The Defendant was charged in an amended Information with Burglary, 
a third degree felony, and theft a class A misdemeanor. (R. 007). A jury trial 
was held before the Honorable John R. Morris on February 23, 2005. The jury 
found the Defendant guilty of both counts. (R. 43-44). The Defendant was 
sentenced on April 4, 2005 to a term of zero to five years at the Utah State 
Prison and three hundred and sixty-five days to run concurrently. (R. 83-84). 
The original sentence, judgment and commitment was signed on April 5, 2005. 
It contained an error where it read that the theft conviction was a third degree 
felony. (R. 84). The Defendant filed a notice of appeal on May 5, 2005. (R. 
88). A second sentence, judgment and commitment that corrected the error 
was signed on June 8, 2005. (R. 86-87). 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
Edmund Best owns the Avon Apartments in Ogden. (R. 124/48). Mr. 
Best knew the Defendant. Mr. Best had previously allowed the Defendant to 
stay in one of the apartments in exchange for work the Defendant did for Mr. 
Best. (R. 124/57). Mr. Best owned a table that he had moved from a house in 
Rose Park to his apartment complex in Ogden. (R. 124/51-53). Mr. Best had 
the table placed in an apartment that was vacant. (R. 124/52). Eventually a 
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tenant was found for the vacant apartment so the table was moved to a nearby 
storage shed which Mr. Best also owned. (R. 124/55). 
Prior to the time the table was moved, the Defendant had been evicted 
from the apartment complex. (R. 124/66). Nonetheless, Mr. Best agreed to 
give the Defendant ten dollars to help move the table into the storage unit. (R. 
124/69). Sometime in March of 2004, the Defendant helped Raymond Egner 
who was the apartment manager move the table to the storage shed. (R. 
124/71-76). After the table was placed in the storage shed, Mr. Egner put a 
master lock on the door. (R. 124/76). 
The next day Mr. Egner discovered that the table was missing. (R. 
124/79). He took some garbage to a dumpster and noticed that the door was 
ajar. (R. 124/79). He looked inside and noticed that the table was gone. (R. 
124/80). 
David Worthen owns some rental properties near the Avon Apartments. 
(R. 124/92-93). Mr. Worthen knew the Defendant. He had interacted with him 
approximately six times. (R. 124/97). In March of 2004, he was working on a 
fence on his property when he saw the Defendant. The Defendant "froze for a 
minute." (R. 124/99). Mr. Worthen noticed that the Defendant was carrying a 
table leg. (R. 124/102). Mr. Worthen also noticed a table leaning against the 
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storage shed. (R. 124/103). Mr. Worthen didn't see anyone with the 
Defendant. (R. 124/104). 
Mr. Worthen went back to working on his fence. (R. 124/104). A few 
minutes later he saw an SUV drive off. The table was in the back of the SUV 
and was hanging out of the back. (R. 124/105). Mr. Worthen saw the driver 
and it wasn't the Defendant. He didn't see the Defendant in the SUV, but he 
testified that the Defendant could have been in the vehicle. Mr. Worthen didn't 
see the Defendant after the SUV left. (R. 124/106). 
When Defendant's attorney cross-examined Mr. Egner he questioned 
him about the Defendant being evicted. The following colloquy took place. 
Q. And I understand that he was evicted because of non-
payment or because of the number of people coming and 
going? 
A. Nuisance eviction. 
Q. I'm sorry? 
A. Nuisance eviction, smoking, traffic. 
Q. But you never saw anything that would have led you to 
believe there were drugs going on in the apartment? 
A. Oh, I saw a lot of that. 
Q. You actually saw something that led to drugs? 
A. High traffic. 
Q. High traffic, [inaudible] lights, things like that. 
(R. 124/85-86). On direct examination, Mr. Worthen testified that he knew 
the Defendant because he had been over at Dean's [Mr. Best's] apartment and 
because occasionally he would come over and offer to sell something. (R. 
124/97). Mr. Worthen was asked by the prosecutor what the Defendant had 
tried to sell. Mr. Worthen answered that there was a light fixture. The 
Defendant had told him that they were doing work and had bought extras and 
wondered if he wanted to buy one. (R. 124/97). The Defendant had also 
offered to sell a carpet shampooer because they had bought a new one for the 
apartment. (R. 124/98). Nothing else was mentioned during direct 
examination about these items. On cross-examination with Mr. Worthen the 
following colloquy took place. 
Q. I'm going to ask some questions about a light dome and a carpet 
shampooer and some other things. Were any of those items ever 
reported to you as having been stolen? 
A. The shampooer, it was kind of funny that he asked me about the 
shampooer and then one day . . . a cop knocks on my door and he 
asked me if Paul Newkirk [Defendant] was there and I said you've 
got the wrong address, he doesn't live here and he said, well, 
we're investigating a . . . carpet shampooer that had been stolen. 
And that was after he had asked me about the shampooer. 
(R. 124/113-14). During closing argument Defendant's trial attorney said to 
the jury "[n]ow I'm not going to tell you that Paul Newkirk is a clean one 
owner, okay? He's done some things in his life he's not real proud of He's 
probably not the person you want fixing stuff around your house. He's had a 
tough life and he made some bad choices but that does make him guilty of 
burglary and theft. (R. 124/140). 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution guarantees the 
right for each defendant to receive the effective assistance of counsel. There is 
a two part test articulated by the Supreme Court in Strickland v. Washington, 
466 U.S. 668 (1984), that is used to determine whether counsel's performance 
was deficient. The first step in the test is that a defendant must show that 
counsel's performance was deficient. This requires a showing that the errors 
made were so serious that counsel was not functioning as the counsel 
guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment. The second part of the test is that it must 
be shown that the deficient performance prejudiced the defendant. 
Both prongs of the Strickland test were met in this case. Defendant's 
trial attorney was deficient when he opened the door for the introduction of the 
Defendant's prior bad acts into evidence. This was evidence which would 
have otherwise been inadmissible and was extremely prejudicial to the 
Defendant. The case was built almost entirely on circumstantial evidence. 
Without the prior bad act evidence there is a reasonable likelihood that the jury 
would have reached a more favorable conclusion for the Defendant. 
ARGUMENT 
THE DEFENDANT RECEIVED INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF 
COUNSEL WHEN HIS ATTORNEY OPENED THE DOOR FOR 
PRIOR BAD ACTS AND THEN REFERED TO THEM DURING 
CLOSING ARGUMENTS. 
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The United States Supreme Court has recognized that "the right to 
counsel is the right to the effective assistance of counsel." Strickland v. 
Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 686, 80 L.Ed.2d 674, 692 (1984). In Strickland, the 
Supreme Court established a two-part test to determine whether counsel's 
assistance was ineffective. "First, the defendant must show that counsel's 
performance was deficient. This requires showing that counsel made errors so 
serious that counsel was not functioning as the 'counsel' guaranteed the 
defendant by the Sixth Amendment." Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. at 
687, 80L.Ed.2dat693. 
In State v. Crestani, 111 P.2d 1085, 1089 (Utah Ct. App. 1989), this 
Court stated that"judicial scrutiny of counsel's performance must be highly 
deferential and recognize the importance of sound trial strategy." In 
Strickland, the Supreme Court held that the appellant must "identify the acts or 
omissions of counsel that are alleged not to have been the result of reasonable 
professional judgment. The court must then determine whether, in light of all 
the circumstances, the identified acts or omissions were outside the wide range 
of professionally competent assistance." Strickland, U.S. at 690. 
There were three specific instances where Defendant's counsel rendered 
ineffective assistance. Defendant's counsel solicited information about 
Defendant's prior bad acts from two separate witnesses. Defendant's attorney 
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then made reference to the Defendant's questionable character during his 
closing argument. 
The first instance of ineffective assistance being complained of is when 
Mr. Egner,the apartment complex manager, was being cross-examined. 
Defendant's attorney questioned him as to the reasons Defendant was evicted 
from his apartment. 
Q. And I understand that he was evicted because of non-payment or 
because of the number of people coming and going? 
A. Nuisance eviction. 
Q. I'm sorry? 
A. Nuisance eviction, smoking, traffic. 
Q. But you never saw anything that would have led you to believe there 
were drugs going on in the apartment? 
A. Oh, I saw a lot of that. 
Q. You actually saw something that led to drugs? 
A. High traffic. 
Q. High traffic, [inaudible] lights, things like that. 
(R. 124/85-86). The issue of Defendant having been evicted was of no 
relevance in the matter. Furthermore, Mr. Egner had already testified on direct 
examination that there was no hostility from the Defendant over the matter, 
that the Defendant had helped clean up his apartment after he had been evicted 
and that he still was occasionally around the apartment complex and that 
following the eviction he was hired on at least one occasion to do some work. 
(R. 124/67-69). In addition, the subject of drugs had not come up. The 
Defendant's attorney introduced the possibility of drug activity and then 
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allowed Mr. Egner to testify that he had seen "a lot" of activity that led him to 
believe there was drug activity in the Defendant's apartment. (R. 124/85-86). 
The second reference to prior bad acts of the Defendant came during 
cross-examination of Dave Worthen. Mr. Worthen had testified that he had 
interacted with the Defendant a half dozen times prior to the table theft. He 
testified that Defendant would come over and offer to sell him various items. 
Mr. Worthen was asked by the prosecutor what the Defendant had tried to sell. 
Mr. Worthen answered that there was a light fixture. The Defendant had told 
him that they were doing work and had bought extras and wondered if he 
wanted to buy one. (R. 124/97). The Defendant had also offered to sell a 
carpet shampooer because they had bought a new one for the apartment. (R. 
124/98). Nothing else was mentioned during direct examination about these 
items. There was no discussion about these items being stolen or about the 
Defendant being a thief. Nonetheless, on cross-examination with Mr. Worthen 
Defendant's attorney asked: 
Q. I'm going to ask some questions about a light dome and a carpet 
shampooer and some other things. Were any of those items ever 
reported to you as having been stolen? 
A. The shampooer, it was kind of funny that he asked me about the 
shampooer and then one day . . . a cop knocks on my door and he 
asked me if Paul Newkirk [Defendant] was there and I said you've 
got the wrong address, he doesn't live here and he said, well, we're 
investigating a . . . carpet shampooer that had been stolen. And that 
was after he had asked me about the shampooer. 
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(R. 124/113-14). Mr. Worthen knew that Defendant did some work for Mr. 
Best. There was also testimony from Mr. Egner that Defendant did 
maintenance work, cleaning and painting at the apartment complex. (R. 
124/68). Mr. Worthen's testimony that the Defendant had come over and 
offered to sell an extra dome light and a carpet shampooer was realistic and 
there was no reason at that point to suspect that Defendant had stolen those 
items. But then, on cross-examination, Defendant's attorney brought up the 
possibility of them being stolen and allowed Mr. Worthen to testify that the 
police came looking for the Defendant. Defendant's attorney also allowed, 
without objection, the hearsay statements that the police were investigating the 
Defendant for stealing a carpet shampooer. (R. 124/113-14). 
The final instance of ineffective assistance of counsel being complained 
of occurred during Defendant's closing argument. During the argument his 
attorney said to the jury; "Now I'm not going to tell you that Paul Newkirk is a 
clean one owner, okay? He's done some things in his life he's not real proud 
of. He's probably not the person you want fixing stuff around your house. 
He's had a tough life and he made some bad choices but that does make him 
guilty of burglary and theft. (R. 124/140). 
The State had not introduced any evidence that Defendant had 
questionable character outside of the crimes he was on trial for. It was 
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Defendant's attorney who introduce drug activity and prior thefts. Defendant's 
attorney then referenced them by telling the jury the Defendant was not the 
person they want fixing stuff around their homes and that Defendant had made 
some bad choice and done things he wasn't proud of. These statements could 
have no effect other than refreshing for the jury the Defendant's questionable 
character and his propensity to use drugs and commit thefts. 
This prior bad act evidence was highly prejudicial to the Defendant. It 
could have only served to inflame the jury and show that he has a bad 
character. In State v. Johnson, 748 P.2d 1069 (Utah 1987), the Utah Supreme 
Court stated that "this Court has repeatedly held that evidence of other crimes 
may not be admitted to prove that the defendant has a bad character or a 
disposition to commit the crime charged." Id. at 1075. 
Rule 404(b) of the Utah Rules of Evidence states, 
Evidence of other crimes, wrongs or acts is not admissible to 
prove the character of a person in order to show action in 
conformity therewith. It may, however, be admissible for other 
purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, 
preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or 
accident. In other words, evidence offered under this rule is 
admissible if it is relevant for a non-character purpose and meets 
the requirements of 402 and 403.U.R.E. 404(b)(2002). 
In Johnson, the Supreme Court held that "[t]o give meaning to the policy 
embodied in Rule 404(b), evidence of other crimes must be reasonably 
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necessary and highly probative of a material issue." State v. Johnson, 748 P.2d 
at 1075. 
In State v. Webster, 32 P.3d 976 (Utah Ct. App. 2001), this court 
reversed the trial court when it allowed prior bad act evidence at the trial. The 
defendant had been charged with stealing a car from a dealership lot. The trial 
court allowed evidence that the defendant did the same thing in Virginia. 
This Court relied on State v. DeCorso, 993 P.2d 837 (Utah 1999) in its 
analysis. In DeCorso, there were "numerous" and "signature-like" similarities 
between the two offenses. In Webster, this Court held that "evidence of a prior 
bad act should be admitted only when it is shown 'that the other act and the 
charged offense are sufficiently idiosyncratic that a reasonable jury could find 
it more likely than not that the same person performed them both.'" State v. 
Webster, 32 P.3d at 987 (quoting United States v. Trenkler, 61 F.3d 45, 53 (1st 
Cir. 1995)). 
There were no tactical reasons to bring to light Defendant's prior bad 
acts of theft and drug use. There was nothing to be gained by it and the only 
thing that could have resulted from the errors was prejudice to the Defendant. 
For these reasons, the first prong of the Strickland test is met. 
The second prong of the Strickland test is the defendant must show that 
the deficient performance prejudiced him. This requires showing that 
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counsel's errors were so serious as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial, a trial 
whose result is reliable." Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. at 687, 80 L.Ed. 
2d at 693. 
In Strickland, the Court held that "[t]he purpose of the Sixth Amendment 
guarantee of counsel is to ensure that a defendant has the assistance necessary 
to justify reliance on the outcome of the proceeding." In State v. Templin, 805 
P.2d 182 (Utah 1990), the Utah Supreme Court held that to meet the second 
part of the Strickland test a defendant "must show that there is a reasonable 
probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the 
proceeding would have been different. A reasonable probability is a 
probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome." Id. at 
187(quoting Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 694 (1984)). In making 
the determination that counsel was ineffective the appellate court should 
"consider the totality of the evidence, taking into account such factors as 
whether the errors affect the entire evidentiary picture or have an isolated effect 
and how strongly the verdict is supported by the record." Id. 
The Defendant would suggest that this prong has been met. The case 
against the Defendant was based almost entirely on circumstantial evidence. 
The Defendant was convicted of burglary and theft even though he wasn't 
observed entering the storage shed and there were no incriminating statements 
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made by the Defendant. The State's case consisted of the fact that Defendant 
had helped move the table into the storage shed the day before it disappeared; 
that he was seen near the storage shed carrying something that looked like a 
table leg and that the table was leaning against the shed; that a short time later a 
SUV driven by someone other than the Defendant drove off with the table. 
The Defendant was not observed in the SUV. 
Informing the jury that the Defendant was involved with drugs and other 
thefts was highly prejudicial. If the "taint" caused by inadmissible evidence is 
sufficient, "it is irrelevant that there is sufficient untainted evidence to support 
a verdict." State v. Mitchell, 779 P.2d 1116, 1122 (Utah 1989). 
Admittedly, this case presents a difficult problem. Had it been the 
prosecutor who elicited the testimony concerning the Defendant's prior bad 
acts the analysis would be a simpler one. The law concerning prior bad acts is 
well settled and in this regard the conviction should be reversed under a plain 
error standard of review. 
In State v. Holgate, 10 P.3d 346, 350 (Utah 2000) the Utah Supreme 
Court held "as a general rule, claims not raised before the trial court may not be 
raised on appeal." A defendant must show the following to establish plain 
error, "(i) An error exists; (ii) the error should have been obvious to the trial 
court; (iii) the error is harmful, i.e., absent the error, there is a reasonable 
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likelihood of a more favorable outcome for the appellant. . ." State v. Dunn, 
850 P.2d 1201, 1208 (Utah 1993). 
In this case all three elements of plain error have been met. (1) The error 
exists. Evidence of Defendant's drug activity and prior thefts was clearly 
improper. (2) This error should have been obvious to the trial court. This area 
of law has been well settled in Utah and there are numerous appellate decisions 
as well as Rule 404(b) of the Rules of Evidence which govern prior bad acts. 
(3) Absent the error there is a likelihood of a more favorable outcome where 
the evidence was circumstantial. 
The obvious problem is that although it was the State's witness who 
testified to the Defendant's prior bad acts, it was the Defendant's attorney who 
elicited this testimony. It would appear that the invited error doctrine 
precludes the Defendant from now raising the issue of plain error. The invited 
error doctrine provides that "on appeal, a party cannot take advantage of an 
error committed at trial when that party led the trial court into committing the 
error." State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 1220 (Utah 1993)(footnote omitted). 
However, "if counsel's decision in leading the court into error falls 
below the standard of reasonable professional practice, we may find that 
counsel was ineffective." Id. Therefore, this Court is back to determining 
whether these errors were so serious that counsel was not functioning as the 
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counsel guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment. Both prongs of the Strickland 
test were met. The performance was deficient and this deficient performance 
prejudiced the Defendant. For these reasons, this Court should find that there 
was plain error when the trial court allowed the prior bad acts into evidence 
without at least a curative instruction to the jury. This Court should also find 
that although it may have been invited error by Defendant's counsel, his 
counsel's performance fell below the standard of reasonable professional 
practice. Therefore, the Defendant was denied his Sixth Amendment right to 
competent counsel to the degree that confidence in the outcome has been 
compromised. For these reasons, the Defendant respectfully requests this 
Court to reverse his convictions and grant him a new trial. 
CONCLUSION 
The Defendant received ineffective assistance of counsel when his 
attorney elicited prior bad act evidence from the State's witnesses. There was 
not sound trial strategy that would justify introducing this evidence. 
Furthermore, the Defendant was prejudiced by this evidence. For these 
reasons, the Defendant respectfully requests this Court to reverse his 
conviction. 
DATED this 3 day of January, 2006. 
DEE W.SMITH 
Attorney for Appellant 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I certify that I mailed two copies of the foregoing Brief of Appellant to 
Mark Shurtleff, Utah Attorney General, Attorney for the Plaintiff, 160 East 300 
South, 6th Floor PO Box 140854 SLC, Utah 84,14 4-0180,>qst^ge prepaid 
this j^day of January, 2006. /~IL^'/" /-- ^/~A "A 
\m^ 
DEE W. SMITH ' ^ 
Attorney at Law 
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ADDENDUM A 
tone "• v o r^i 31 
SECOND DISTRICT COURT - OGDEN COURT— ' -l'* 
WEBER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH jjV^  0 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
PAUL IRONHORSE NEWKIRK, 
Defendant. 
AMENDED 
MINUTES 
APP SENTENCING 
SENTENCE, JUDGMENT, COMMITMENT 
Case No: 041902619 FS 
Judge: JOHN R MORRIS 
Date: April 4, 2005 
PRESENT 
Clerk: carier 
Prosecutor: HEWARD, GARY R 
Defendant 
Defendant's Attorney(s): ROY COLE, PDA 
DEFENDANT INFORMATION 
Date of birth: March 8, 1965 
Video 
Tape Number: M04 04 05 Tape Count: 103 6 
CHARGES 
1. BURGLARY - 3rd Degree Felony 
Plea: Guilty - Disposition: 03/29/2005 Guilty 
2. THEFT (amended) - Class A 
Misdemeanor 
Plea: Guilty - Disposition: 03/29/2005 Guilty 
HEARING 
This is time set for APP Sentencing. The defendant is present in 
custody from the Weber County Jail with counsel. Court proceeds 
with sentencing. 
Page 1 
0. C 
Case No: 041902619 
Date: Apr 04, 2005 
SENTENCE PRISON 
Based on the defendant's conviction of BURGLARY a 3rd Degree 
Felony, the defendant is sentenced to an indeterminate term of not 
to exceed five years in the Utah State Prison. 
COMMITMENT is to begin immediately. 
To the WEBER County Sheriff: The defendant is remanded to your 
custody for transportation to the Utah State Prison where the 
defendant will be confined. 
SENTENCE PRISON CONCURRENT/CONSECUTIVE NOTE 
Each term is to run concurrent with the other. 
SENTENCE JAIL 
Based on the defendant's conviction of THEFT a Class A Misdemeanor, 
the defendant is sentenced to a term of 365 day(s) 
SENTENCE JAIL SERVICE NOTE 
The 365 days jail shall be served at the Utah State Prison. 
Restitution in this matter is to be left open for 90 days. 
Dated this p day of J(JUV^. _, 20 OC^ T""" 
rojjN R MORRIS 
district Court Judge 
or? 
Page 2 (last) 
